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1. INTRODUCTION
Two courts have applied consequential damage provi-
sions found in international conventions. A court in the
United States recently applied provisions of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods ("CISG" or "Convention").' In 1980, the German
Supreme Court applied a substantively similar consequen-
tial damage provision of the earlier Hague Convention on
the International Sale of Goods ("TLIS")' in a decision that
has predictive value for future applications of the CISG.'
* Associate Dean & Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School
of Law; BA., University of Connecticut; LL.B., University of California,
Hastings; LL.M., New York University. The author thanks Professors
Peter Schlechtriem and Albert H. Kritzer for their suggestions and
criticisms of prior drafts. The final draft of this Article is the author's
sole responsibility.
See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), S. TREATY Doc. No. 9,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983), 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
2 See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107.
' ULIS Article 82 is the source of and is substantively similar to
CISG Article 74. See ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 477 (1989). Germany and the
United States are now signatories to the CISG. For commentary on the
U.S. adoption of the CISG, see infra note 13. For commentary on the
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This Article will analyze whether these two courts ap-
proached consequential damages in a manner that is more
consistent with prior national law than with the develop-
ment of a unified international approach to international
sales disputes.4
Section 2 of this Article explores a U.S. district court's
approach to damages under the CISG in the case of Delchi
Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp.5 After analyzing the ratio-
nale behind the damage award in Delchi, Section 3 discuss-
es a German Supreme Court decision applying a provision
analogous to the CISG. Finally, Section 4 concludes that
the U.S. court applied the international CISG provisions in
a manner consistent with its national law, while the
German Court elevated international principles over
national law. Because of the U.S. court's inability to set
aside its own national thinking, this case represents an
unfortunate first decision on the subject of consequential
damages under the CISG.
2. THE U.S. CASE: DELCHI CARRIER
In Delchi, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York applied the consequential damages
provisions of the CISG as the controlling law of the dispute.
The Delchi plaintiff ("Buyer") was an Italian manufacturer
and seller of air conditioners and the defendant ("Seller")
was a New York corporation. In January 1988, Seller
German adoption of the ULIS and later the CISG, see infra sections 3
and 4.
' The problem of differing interpretive approaches to international
sales disputes has been predicted. See Patrick Thieffry, Sale of Goods
Between French and U.S. Merchants: Choice of Law Considerations
Under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 22 INT'L LAW. 1017, 1021 (1988). For a discussion of damage
terminology in civil and common law jurisdictions, see Ugo Draetta, The
Notion of Consequential Damages in the International Trade Practice:
A Merger of Common Law and Civil Law Concepts, 4 INT'L BUS. L.J.
487 (1991).
' See Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994
WL 495787 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994). The decision was appealed and
cross-appealed. The court of appeals affirmed with little comment on
the issues raised in this Article, but remanded on other grounds. See
Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., Nos. 95-7182, 95-7186 (2d Cir.
Dec. 6, 1995).
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contracted to sell Buyer 10,800 Rotorex model compressors,
which were to be delivered in three installments by May 15,
1988.6 Buyer, apparently at the time of the contract,
informed Seller that it was going to use the compressors to
manufacture its "Ariele" line of air conditioners, a product
which Buyer expected to sell in the summer of 1988.'
On March 26, 1988, Seller sent 2,438 compressors to
Buyer and received a $188,923.46 payment by letters of
credit.' Seller sent the second installment of compressors
on or around May 9, 1988 and received $129,985.60, also in
the form of letters of credit? When the second installment
was in transit, Buyer, while attempting to install the first
shipment of compressors, discovered that the Rotorex
compressors were nonconforming."0 Buyer attempted to
correct the nonconformity in various ways in order to avoid
damages," but ultimately Buyer rejected the compressors
and cancelled the contract.1
2
After deciding that the CISG 3 governed this contract,
the U.S. district court found that Seller breached the
contract by failing to supply 10,800 conforming compres-
sors. 4 The court then awarded Buyer "consequential"
6 See id. at *1.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 In an attempt to cure the defect, Delchi shipped substitute
Rotorex grommets to its manufacturing plant, spent 790.5 hours to
insert the special grommets, paid for a shipment of additional Rotorex
connectors, and finally inspected and tested the compressors above what
was normally expected. See id. at *2.
12 See id. at *1.
"3 CISG is codified at 15 U.S.C.A. app. (West Supp. 1995). The
CISG was ratified by the U.S. Senate on October 9, 1986, and took
effect on January 1, 1988. "Disputes arising out of international sales
contracts formed after January 1, 1988[,] between merchants from
signatory nations may be governed by the [CISGI rather than the
Uniform Commercial Code or foreign sales law, unless the parties
specifically state otherwise." See Eric C. Schneider, The Seller's Right
to Cure Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 7 ARIZ. J.
iNL & COMP. L. 69, 69-70 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
14 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *4-5.
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damages15 for those costs incurred which were "a foresee-
able result of [Seller's] breach" and which were "both
commercially reasonable and reasonably foreseeable."
16
These foreseeable and reasonable damages included: (1) the
costs of labor, materials, and shipping that Buyer incurred
because of the unsuccessful attempt to remedy the noncon-
forming Rotorex compressors; (2) the costs Buyer incurred
to expedite the delivery of previously ordered Sanyo
compressors as replacements in its Ariele units; (3) the cost
of handling and storage of the rejected Rotorex compressors;
(4) the lost profit from lower sales volume of Arieles ordered
in the summer of 1988; and (5) pre-judgment interest.
17
The court rejected Buyer's damage request for anticipated
profits which Buyer claimed on orders which it could have
filled if able to produce more Arieles.18
2.1. Background
2.1.1. The Delchi Court's Overview of the CISG
Before ruling on plaintiff's damage claims, the court
made a few general statements about remedies available
under the CISG. The district court noted that the CISG
allows lost profit resulting from a diminished volume of
sales. 9 Additionally, under CISG Article 74, Buyer was
"entitled to collect monetary damages for [Seller's] breach
in 'a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit,' although
not in excess of the amount reasonably envisioned by the
parties."
20
Contrary to the district court statement, however, CISG
15 Consequential damage generally is defined as "[t]hose losses or
injuries which are a result of an act but are not direct and immediate."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
16 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5.
17 Id. at *5-7.
18 See id. at *6 (holding that "Delchi [cannot] recover on its claim for
additional lost profits in Italy because the amount of damages, if any,
can not be established with reasonable certainty.").
19 See id. (citing JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES § 415 (2d ed. 1991) and Jeffrey S. Sutton, Comment, Measuring
Damages Under the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 737, 747-48 (1989)).
20 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5.
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Article 74 does not in fact limit damages to an amount
"reasonably envisioned" by both parties, but rather limits
damages in terms of what the breaching party did actually
foresee or could reasonably foresee.21 Article 74 states:
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist
of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit,
suffered by the other party as a consequence of the
breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss
which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract,
in the light of the facts and matters of which he then
knew or ought to have known, as a possible conse-
quence of the breach of contract.22
Instead of referring to the foreseeability language of the
CISG, the U.S. district court stated the test in the narrower
terms of New York law.23 New York law or Italian law
might have been the controlling law in a case involving
diversity jurisdiction such as Delchi had the district court
not already decided that the CISG was the controlling law
of the case. New York law differs from the CISG by
allowing consequential damages only when there is evidence
that the defendant tacitly agreed to assume responsibility
for such damages.24 The Delchi court's use of the "in
21 See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
"[I]t may fairly be said that the New York courts have generally
purported to follow the 'contemplation' test and that the application of
this test has narrowed recovery of damages ... more than the 'had
reason to know' test of the Code." 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT, Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, 702
(1980). But see Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., Consequential Damages in
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Legacy of Hadley,
23 GEO. WASH. J. INWL L. & ECON. 415, 435 n.103 (1989). Murphey
believes the difference in the tests is only apparent since "[n]o case has
been found in which recovery was denied because the injured party did
not foresee the loss." Id. at 435.
2 See Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986)
(Kenford I). In Kenford II, the New York position was further clarified:
"In determining the reasonable contemplation of the parties, the nature,
619
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contemplation of parties" limitation reflects a distinct
development in U.S. law, not the language of CISG Article
74.
The CISG is meant to be interpreted and applied in a
manner which promotes uniformity of application. Matters
not expressly governed by the Convention are to be settled
"in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based."25  The Delchi court correctly stated that CISG
Article 74 is based on a general principle: that damages
should provide the injured party with the benefit of the
bargain, including expectation and reliance damages.26
This Section examines whether the U.S. district court's
decision in Delchi upheld this general CISG principle.
Although the district court cites CISG articles as the
controlling law on each item of recovery, analysis of the
decision reveals that the court was influenced more by a
national legal tradition, as developed by state law, than by
a policy favoring the unification of international sales law.
In applying the traditional U.S. limitations on damages, the
Delchi court used a more restrictive approach than most
state courts and courts of other nations utilize when
applying the CISG.
purpose[,] and particular circumstances of the contract known by the
parties should be considered, as well as 'what liability the defendant
fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have
warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when
the contract was made.' Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d
176, 179 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted). For a further discussion of the
foreseeability limitation in U.S. courts, see infra note 42 and accompa-
nying text.
' See CISG art. 7, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 23-24, 19
I.L.M. at 673.
26 The provision of expectation and reliance damages is consistent
with the philosophy of the drafters of the CISG. See Commentary on
the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979), reprinted
in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATION-
AL SALE OF GOODS, OFFICIAL RECORDS at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19,
U.N. Sales No. E.81.IV.3 (1981) [hereinafter Commentary]. A similar
principle is found in the U.C.C. and also underlies U.S. law generally.
See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1991) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall
be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be
put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but
neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except
as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.").
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2.1.2. Limitations on Damages in the United States
It is understandable that a U.S. district court, with its
common law and statutory heritage, might apply the CISG
differently than a court in a civil law jurisdiction. In the
U.S. judicial system, unlike in civil law systems, only the
parties are responsible for presenting evidence and must do
so under more restrictive rules of evidence and according to
varying levels and shifting burdens of proof.27 In deter-mining consequential damages, the trial judge or jury
initially will take evidence and make findings of fact. As in
most other countries, this evidentiary and fact finding
process at early common law was entirely a determination
of fact." Judges did not try to control or limit the jury's
award of damages.29 In the late eighteenth century,
however, when the perception developed that jury awards
were disproportionate, judges developed a number of devices
to limit the fact finding function of juries and to limit
awards of consequential damages.
30
In the United States, trial judges control damage awards
through procedural mechanisms. For example, trial judges
rule on the admissibility of evidence, instruct juries on the
law and on the amount of damages allowed, and, if the
2 In Germany, a civil law jurisdiction, the evidentiary hearing is
dominated by the court, not by the parties. A plaintiff does, however,
usually have the burden of proving facts establishing a claim beyond a
reasonable doubt, but relies on a general presumption that events
generally occur in a normal way unless there is proof to the contrary.
See GERHARD DANNEMANN, AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL LAW 101-03 (1993); JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION To THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 111-23 (2d ed. 1985); William B. Fisch,
Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 HASTINGS INL
& COMP. L. REV. 221, 279-82 (1983).
' See George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law
II, 48 LAw Q. REv. 90, 108 (1932) ("In the early law the problem of
compensation was treated as one of fact for the jury, subject to certain
mechanisms for checking the abuse of discretion . ... ) [hereinafter
Washington, Damages I).
9 See George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law,
47 LAW Q. REV. 345, 351-52 (1931); Washington, Damages II, supra
note 28, at 90.
'0 See Washington, Damages II, supra note 28, at 90.
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damage award is excessive, set aside jury verdicts after
trial and order a new trial."1 A trial judge's ruling on a
motion for a new trial is a matter of law and subject to
appeal and further analysis by appellate court judges. 2
In addition to these procedural devices, U.S. courts also
developed three substantive legal doctrines that limit
damage awards: avoidability, foreseeability, and certain-
ty.3 Although each of the three traditional limitations on
damages seem to involve factual determinations, U.S.
judges routinely make findings "as a matter of law" on
foreseeability, certainty, and avoidability, as well as causa-
tion in situations where reasonable persons could not
differ.
34
This process of ruling "as a matter of law" has led to two
distinguishable practices. Under the first practice, a judge,
after allowing a plaintiff's evidence on damages, may find
the evidence inadequate to prove the plaintiff's case as a
matter of law. Under the second practice, a U.S. judge
may bar the presentation of any evidence of certain types of
damage as a matter of law.36 This second practice of
barring the presentation of evidence has led to stricter
limitations on damages in U.S. courts than in courts of
other countries.
31 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 873 (2d ed. 1990).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 873-74.
4 See id. at 527 (stating that courts have the general power to
treat a question of fact as one of qaw' if the jury could reasonably find
only one way"); Murphey, supra note 23, at 466 ("[C]ourts now have a
practice of limiting recovery in the 'harsh' case solely by saying that
damages [are] ... 'unforeseeable' not as a matter of fact, but as a
matter of fact and law."). As one observed stated:
Nearly all cases cited ... [in a study on the application of the
foreseeability test] are decisions on appeal by defendant.
Plaintiff often obtains satisfactory results at the trial, but loses
all or part of his verdict when defendant appeals. Appellate
courts will probably be inclined to sustain the trial court's
judgment when the record discloses its logical, as well as
evidentiary, basis.
Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and
Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 1026-27 n.181 (1956)
[hereinafter Lost Profits].
35 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 537-38.
36 See id. at 538-39.
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An intentional result of these devices and practices is to
limit damages to the amount of actual risk that a defendant
undertakes at the time of contracting." The practice of
limiting damages to the risk undertaken was consistent
with the historical trend of limiting damages in an age of
industrialization, an age of eschewing damages which might
be a disincentive to contracting.8 Although the recent
trend in most U.S. jurisdictions has been to relax the
restrictions on damages - a trend more favorable to the
injured party 9 - some states, such as New York, continue
to restrict consequential damage awards. The influence of
this restrictive view of consequential damages is evident in
the Delchi court's application of the CISG articles.
2.2. Damages Awarded by the Delchi Court
2.2.1. Damages for the Costs of Attempting to Remedy
First, the Delchi court awarded damages to compensate
Buyer for costs of labor, materials, and shipping incurred as
a result of its unsuccessful attempts to remedy the noncon-
formity of Rotorex's compressors.40 The court cited no
article of the CISG to support this award, although it did
seem to conclude that, under the criteria of CISG Article 74,
the costs of labor, materials, and shipping "were [expenses]
that would not have been incurred without Rotorex's
breach," and that these expenses were "a foreseeable result
of Rotorex's breach."
41
The Uniform Commercial Code ('"U.C.C.")4' and the Re-
s' See Lost Profits, supra note 34, at 1020.
38 The limitations on damages of causation, foreseeability, and
certainty have been used by U.S. judges to limit "disproportionate
damages [that] may induce defendant and other businessmen in similar
occupations to shun bilateral contracts entirely or to insure against
future losses by insisting on liquidated damages that fall short of full
compensation, even when the loss would not be disproportionate." Lost
Profits, supra note 34, at 996.
" The trend of awarding consequential damages now favors the
injured party. See Murphey, supra note 23, at 422.
40 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5.
41 See id.
42 "Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation[,]
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statement (Second) of Contracts ("Restatement of Con-
tracts'") would characterize these labor, materials, and
shipping expenses as "incidental" damages, not limited by
the foreseeability test. According to the U.C.C. and Restate-
ment of Contracts, the buyer must only show these damages
are reasonable." Under U.S. law, "incidental damages"
include additional costs incurred after a breach in a
reasonable attempt to avoid loss, even if the attempt is
unsuccessful, while "consequential damages" include such
items as injury to person and property, and lost profits
caused by the breach.45
The CISG, however, does not provide for the awarding
of incidental damages: it mentions only the recovery of
consequential damages,46 which, under CISG Article 74,
and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay
or other breach." U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1991).
" "Subject to the limitations stated in §§ 350-53, the injured party
has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured
by ... (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss,
caused by the breach .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 347 (1981).
44 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 266 (3d ed. 1988); see also, Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849
P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App. 1993) (stating that in order to recover
incidental damages, "a buyer must show that the damages resulting
from the breach were reasonable"); Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co.,
709 P.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Wash. 1985) (contrasting the difference
between consequential damages and incidental damages). But see also,
Mohler v. Jeke, 595 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating that
in order "to recover incidental damages under a breach of contract
theory, the damages suffered must be direct and foreseeable").
45 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 880-81; see also U.C.C. § 2-
715(2)(a) (1991) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover
or otherwise.").
46 See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688. Nothing in the CISG suggests an intention to abolish
incidental damages. See KRITZER, supra note 3, at 19; Murphey, supra
note 23, at 459; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 266
(distinguishing between "incidental" and "consequential" damages).
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must be "foreseeable" to be recoverable.' The lack of a
foreseeability requirement in U.S. law for incidental damag-
es48 may explain why the judge in Delchi failed to state
any facts that justified the finding that these labor, materi-
al, and shipping expenses were foreseeable.
2.2.2. Damages for the Cost of Expediting Delivery
Second, the Delchi court awarded Buyer damages under
CISG Article 77 for the cost of expediting the shipment of
previously ordered replacement Sanyo compressors as part
of an unsuccessful attempt to replace the defective Rotorex
compressors.49 The district court found that such expedit-
ed action did not constitute "cover"50 because Delchi had
ordered the Sanyo compressors before the formation of the
contract with Rotorex.51 CISG Article 77 provides:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take
such measures as are reasonable in the circumstan-
ces to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit,
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such
measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction
in the damages in the amount by which the loss
' See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688.
48 See U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1991).
49 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 ("Nonetheless, Delchi's action
in expediting shipment of Sanyo compressors was both commercially
reasonable and reasonably foreseeable, and therefore Delchi is entitled
to recover 504,305,665 lire as the net cost of early delivery of Sanyo
compressors . .. ").
" Cover is the right of the party claiming damages to recover "[i]f
the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a
reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in
replacement or the seller has resold the goods." CISG art. 75, supra
note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 37, 19 I.L.M. at 689.
"' See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 ("The shipment of previously
ordered Sanyo compressors did not constitute cover under []CISG
[Alrticle 75, because the Sanyo units were previously ordered, and
hence can not be said to have replaced the nonconforming Rotorex
compressors.").
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should have been mitigated.52
Article 77 is phrased in terms similar to the
"avoidability" limitation on contract damages which
developed in early common law.5" The purpose of Article
77 is the same as the provisions of the Restatement of Con-
tracts54 and the U.C.C.55 which deny recovery of damages
that could have been reasonably avoided.56
Although the CISG, the Restatement, and the U.C.C. are
phrased in terms of reducing damage awards to the extent
a plaintiff could have reasonably avoided them, the judge in
Delchi turned a shield into a sword and interpreted CISG
Article 77 as requiring mitigation and allowing consequen-
tial damages for costs incurred in the mitigation process."
This application of Article 77 is reminiscent of some U.S.
cases criticized for inferring that the injured party is under
a duty to mitigate.5" Requiring mitigation can result in a
misleading interpretation of the CISG because Article 77
was not intended to place liability on the injured party for
52 CISG art. 77, supra note 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9 at 37, 19 I.L.M.
at 689.
" See Vertue and Bird, 84 Eng. Rep. 1000, 1000 (1677) (holding
that plaintiff in an assumpsit suit cannot collect damages because he
did not attempt to avoid damage to goods).
" The Restatement of Contracts states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recover-
able for loss that the injured party could have avoided without
undue risk, burden or humiliation.
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule
stated in Subsection (1) to the extent that he has made
reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981).
" The U.C.C. states that "[c]onsequential damages resulting from
the seller's breach include (a) any loss resulting ... from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of
contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise. ... " U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1991).
56 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 247, 251 (1979).
67 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 (allowing plaintiff to collect
the cost of mitigating losses).
58 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 897 ("It is sometimes said
that in such cases the injured party is under a duty ... to mitigate
damages. This is mislea ing ....- ).
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failing to avoid damages. Rather, the injured party is
simply precluded from recovering damages which could
have been reasonably avoided. 9
It was unnecessary for the Delchi judge to base this
recovery of mitigation expenses on a requirement to
mitigate. Additionally, it was unnecessary to characterize
the expedited delivery of Sanyo compressors as something
other than cover.6" Since the district court found, in
summary fashion, that these mitigating expenses were
"both commercially reasonable and reasonably foresee-
able,"61 such damages were recoverable as consequential
damages under CISG Article 74.62
2.2.3. Damages for Handling and Storage Costs
Third, the Delchi court awarded damages for the cost of
storage and handling of the rejected Rotorex compres-
" Under U.S. law, the burden of proof for showing that the injured
party has not taken steps to avoid damages is on the party in breach.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 897.
o The Court states in a somewhat circular way that the "Sanyo
compressors did not constitute cover under E]CISG [A]rticle 75, because
the Sanyo units were previously ordered, and hence can not be said to
have replaced the nonconforming Rotorex compressors." Delchi, 1994
WL 495787, at *5. CISG Article 75 defines "cover" goods as those
"bought" within a reasonable time after avoidance. See supra note 50
for a definition of cover. Although the Sanyo compressors were"ordered" previously, it is not clear whether they were "bought," thus
confusing their status as "covered" goods. See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787,
at *5.
61 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5.
r See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688 ("Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of
a sum equal to the loss... suffered... as a consequence of the breach.
Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach
foresaw or ought to have foreseen .... "). Under the U.C.C., plaintiff
can recover commercially reasonable expenditures for unsuccessful
cover or avoidance as "incidental damages." U.C.C. § 2-715 (1991).
Incidental damages include "additional costs incurred after the breach
in a reasonable attempt to avoid loss, even if the attempt is unsuccess-
ful." FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 880-81 (citing Coast Trading Co.
v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that a seller
whose resale was not commercially reasonable cannot recover incidental
damages of costs of resale)).
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sors.6 s Damages for storing and handling the rejected
product, to the extent that such damages were foreseeable,
are clearly recoverable under CISG Article 74 as consequen-
tial damages.6 4 Although the district court did not men-
tion the foreseeability limitation, it did seem to limit the
damages award to those costs which were reasonably
incurred.6" This use of a "reasonable" limitation, however,
is how a U.S. court would treat "incidental" damages under
the U.C.C., which does not require a showing of foresee-
ability,66 rather than how a court should treat such dam-
ages under the CISG, which does require foreseeability.
2.2.4. Damages for Lost Profits
Fourth, Delchi claimed damages for lost profits.67 This
claim for lost profits actually involved two different catego-
ries of loss: (1) lost profits on "actual orders" placed with
Delchi in the summer of 1988; and (2) lost profits on
"indicated orders," or, in other words, orders that Delchi
claimed would have been made had more Arieles been
available.6"
To determine whether the two categories of actual lost
profits and indicated lost profits were recoverable from
Rotorex, the court examined the evidence and made
determinations regarding three aspects of Delchi's evidence:
causation, foreseeability, and proof of damages with
reasonable certainty.69 Again, the district court analyzed
causation, foreseeability, and reasonable certainty in a
manner more consistent with New York law than with the
policy underlying the CISG.
6 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 ("Delchi is entitled to recover
13,200,083 lire for the expenses incurred for handling and storage of
Rotorex's nonconforming compressors.").
' See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688; see also supra note 59.
6 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 ("[T]he court holds that Delchi
is entitled to 2,103,683 lire as a reasonable expense.") (emphasis added).
" See supra note 55.
67 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5-7.
6 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *6.
See id.
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2.2.4.1. Causation
With regard to lost profits from actual orders, the court
allowed Delchi's damages to the extent that these losses
were a "foreseeable and direct result of Rotorex's breach.""
Applying this standard, the district court did not allow
damages for lost profits resulting from actual unfilled
orders due to factors beside the breach, including the
cancellation of an order for 300 units by one buyer whose
customers had cancelled, or the cancellation of a 50 unit
order by Delchi before it knew of the nonconformity of
Rotorex's compressors.7' Delchi was allowed, however, to
recover its lost profit on a 250 unit order by a British firm,
even though the British firm canceled its order in August
1988 "due to a general lack of sales."72 The court found
Delchi's loss on this order recoverable because "those units
would have been already shipped by Delchi in July but for
the Rotorex breach .... Thus the lost sales to the British
affiliate were a direct result of Rotorex's breach."7 3 The
district court did not find the late cancellation or the weak
market for Arieles in Great Britain to be an intervening
cause.
74
The district court did not allow damages for lost profit
on the "indicated orders," orders which Delchi claimed it
could have received but for the breach, because Delchi failed
to prove that the breach caused these losses and that such
losses, if they occurred, were not proved with reasonable
70 Id.
71 See id. at *3.
72Id.
73 Id.
74 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 841. When a contract is
breached or a tort committed, resulting losses or damage may not be
caused by the actual breach or the tort itself, but rather by multiple or
intervening causes, such as the cancellation of an order by Delchi's
British customer or the lack of demand for Arieles in Britain after
Rotorex's breach. Such multiple or intervening causes are less likely to
relieve a defendant from contractual liability than from tort liability.
See id. at 841 n.7 ("Although the same problems of multiple cause and
of intervening cause that enliven the law of torts also arise in connec-
tion with contract damages, they are relatively less important than in
the law of torts.").
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certainty.7" With regard to a number of "indicated orders,"
the district court not only held that the evidence offered by
Delchi was inadmissible because it was speculative, but also
held that Delchi failed to prove that its "inability to fill such
orders was directly attributable to Rotorex's breach."76
Article 74 of the CISG, which discusses causation, allows
"[d]amages for breach ... [for] the loss, including loss of
profits, suffered ... as a consequence of the breach.""
The court applied the causation principles of Article 74 in
a manner consistent with U.S. law, namely that to be
recoverable, a loss must be caused in fact by the breach.7"
2.2.4.2. Foreseeability
The district court found that Delchi's lost profits on
actual orders were a foreseeable result of Rotorex's breach
under CISG Article 74.79 Although the court cited the
CISG, it also stated, in general terms, a test of foreseeabili-
ty more closely resembling New York law than the wording
of the CISG.
The foreseeability limitation on contract damages in U.S.
law developed at common law8° from the English case of
75 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *6.
76 "Delchi's claim of 4,000 additional lost sales in Italy is supported
only by the speculative testimony of Italian sales agents . ... The
number of additional units they might have ordered ... is not in
evidence, as the court sustained Rotorex's timely objections to the
speculative nature of such testimony." Id.
7 See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688.
78 The factual causation requirement in U.S. contract law is similar
to the causation requirement in a tort claim, except that damages in
tort are intended to put the plaintiff in a pre-tort position, while
contract expectation damages put the plaintiff in the same position as
he would have been had there been full performance. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 31, at 871 ("The basic principle for the measurement of
[contract] damages is that of compensation based on the injured party's
expectation."). For expectation damages, which include consequential
damages, the plaintiff must also demonstrate what his position would
have been with contract performance. See id. at 841.
79 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *6.
80 The English court in Hadley v. Baxendale referred to the French
Civil Code's articles 1149-51, and one of the judges referred to the
French requirement offoreseeability. See Guenter H. Treitel, Remedies
for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), in
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Hadley v. Baxendale.s1 The foreseeability limitation is
usually stated as comprising two rules:s2 (1) the injured
party can recover for losses that "may fairly and reasonably
be considered [as] arising naturally, i.e. according to the
usual course of things, from such breach of contract
itself;"83 and (2) that there should be no consequential
damage recovery except "such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result
of the breach of it." 4 This test has evolved into the fore-
seeability limitation s5 now found in the U.C.C. and the
Restatement of Contracts.6 A similar foreseeability limita-
tion on damages is found in many other legal systems, as
well as in CISG Article 74.7
U.S. jurisdictions have not uniformly applied the foresee-
ability limitation. Many state courts interpreted Hadley as
requiring evidence that, at the time of contracting, the
parties contemplated the consequential damages later
2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 58 (Arthur von
Mehren ed., 1976).
81 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
82 See Murphey, supra note 23, at 432 ('The [foreseeability] rule is
often discussed as being two rules or one rule in two parts.").
8 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
8 Id.
8" "Whatever the connotation in Hadley's day, in time, most
authorities in the United States - and some in England - equated
'foreseeability' with 'in the contemplation of the parties' and concluded
that Hadley established a rule of foreseeability." Murphey, supra note
23, at 438.
86 See supra notes 54-55.
87 'The principle of excluding damages for unforeseeable losses is
found in the majority of legal systems." Commentary, supra note 26, at
59. Although numerous scholars claim that the rule offoreseeability in
CISG Article 74 is derived from English common law, it has been
forcefully argued that it is instead derived from French law. See Franco
Ferrari, Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeability of Damages in
Contract Law, 53 LA. L. REV. 1257, 1263-69 (1993); Detlef K6nig,
Voraussehbarkeit des Schadens als Grenze vertraglicher Haftung, in DAS
HAAGER EINHEIThICHE KAUFGESETZ UND DAS DEUTSCHE SCHULDRECHT,
KOLLOQUIM ZUM 65, GEBURTSTAG VON ERNsT VON CAEMMERER 74, 86-
130 (Hans G. Leser & W. Frhr Marschall von Bieberstein eds., 1973).
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sought.88 Some states, such as New York8 9 and Pennsyl-
vania," have held the obligor responsible for damages only
to the extent that he "tacitly agreed to assume responsibili-
ty.""' Although Pennsylvania later rejected the tacit
agreement test,92 New York courts continue to hold that,
as a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot recover consequential
damages without evidence demonstrating a defendant's
tacit agreement at the time of contracting to accept respon-
sibility for such damages.
The "tacit agreement" test has been rejected by most
states and the U.C.C.,93 but its underlying justification -
that the obligor should not be responsible for damages
beyond the risk assumed at the time of contracting -
continues to affect decisionmaking in the United States.
This approach of limiting risk to that assumed at the time
of contracting seems to have received new life in 1981 when
the Restatement of Contracts included section 351(3),
stating:
A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by
excluding recovery for loss of profits, by allowing
88 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 23
(4th ed. 1992).
"9 See Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 179 (N.Y.
1989) ("In determining the reasonable contemplation of the parties, the
nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract should be
considered ... as well as 'what liability the defendant fairly may be
supposed to have assumed consciously... . ) (citation omitted).
o See Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 191 A.2d 376, 377 (Pa.
1963) (holding that contemplation exists where "buyer has communicat-
ed to seller... sufficient facts to make it apparent that damages ...
were within reasonable contemplation of the parties").
"' Morrow v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs, 550 S.W.2d 429, 430
(Ark. 1977); see also Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739
F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating in dicta that consequential damages
are not recoverable unless specifically negotiated).
92 R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 378 A.2d 288,
288 (Pa. 1977) ("[B]uyer was not required to establish ... that seller
contemplated or tacitly agreed....").
"' See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 914-15; U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt.
2 (1991) ("The 'tacit agreement' test for the recovery of consequential
damages is rejected."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 351 cmt.
a (1981) ("[T]he party in breach need not have made a 'tacit agreement'
to be liable for the loss.").
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recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or other-
wise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice
so requires in order to avoid disproportionate com-
pensation.94
Commentary on this section of the Restatement indicates
that this approach is to be used in only exceptional cases,
and courts thus have made little use of it." Nevertheless,
many courts still resist holding a seller liable for damages
for prospective lost profits, and the demise of the tacit
agreement test is still uncertain in some states such as New
York.
Another possible source of nonuniform application of the
CISG in the United States is that the U.C.C. has not
adopted the foreseeability limitation to limit breach of
warranty damages involving an injury to person or proper-
ty. Such breach of warranty damages are recoverable on a
showing of proximate cause alone, regardless offoreseeabili-
ty.6 In this limited instance, contract damages, like tort
damages,9 7 are not limited by foreseeability. It is notewor-
thy that the CISG does not apply to claims for personal
injury or death and does not adopt a different damage
article for breach of warranty, but rather applies Article 74
94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981).
95 See id. § 351 cmt. f(1981) ("There are unusual instances in which
it appears... [that] it would be unjust to put the risk on that party.");
see also JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN COMPARA-
TIVE CONTEXT 189 (1989) (explaining a study which revealed only three
cases that cited § 351(3), the most relevant being All Points Towing,
Inc. v. City of Glendale, 735 P.2d 145 (Ariz. App. 1987)). Lookofsky
expressed the fear of some that the discretionary justice represented by
§ 351(3) goes too far, "posing a threat to commercial certainty and even
to classical contract law." Id. at 291.
9 See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1991) ("Consequential damages resulting
from a seller's breach include ... injury to person or property proxi-
mately resulting from any breach of warranty.").
' In the United States, foreseeability is not a limitation on liability
for tort damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965)
("If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does
not prevent him from being liable.").
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to all damages for breach of contract.9"
An area of further concern is the textual difference
between the U.C.C., the Restatement of Contracts, and the
CISG regarding the extent to which consequential damages
should be foreseen. The U.C.C. allows "any loss resulting
from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller ... had reason to know."99  The Restatement
allows damages for foreseeable probable damages, 100 while
CISG Article 74 allows for damages "which the party in
breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen ... as a possible
consequence of the breach."101 Arguably, the CISG and
the U.C.C. are closer in their textual standards. 02
In the United States, courts have not asked whether, at
the time of contract formation, the defendant foresaw or
could reasonably have foreseen the manner or particular
way in which the loss would result. But, in contract law,
unlike in tort law, the extent of damages recoverable has
been limited to the type of loss that was reasonably foresee-
able at the time of making the contract.'
98 See CISG art. 75, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 689.
99 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (1981) ("Damag-
es are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result....").
101 See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688 (emphasis added).
102 See Farnsworth, supra note 56, at 253. Although the Re-
statement of Contracts and the CISG also apply to seller's consequential
damages, this Article only discusses a buyer's consequential damages.
This approach is taken both because the CISG cases are about buyer's
damages and because, in U.S. courts, seller's claims for loss of direct
profits from defaulting buyers have received very favorable treatment,
raising no important issues offoreseeability. In such cases, courts seem
"to presume foreseeability and certainty rules have been met."
STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 133 (1995).
Commentators argue that this result is appropriate because there is
little danger of damage awards disproportionate to the consideration
defendant would have gotten from performance since "[c]ontract price
is the ceiling of recovery, and the largest cost items to be deducted from
that price are the most susceptible to proof." Lost Profits, supra note
34, at 1003 (citations omitted).
103 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 916 ("One takes the risk...
of those [consequences] that one ought reasonably to have foreseen.").
This is unlike the test in tort law, which rejects the foreseeability limit
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Another textual difference between the CISG and U.S.
law concerns whether foreseeability is based on an objective
or a subjective test. In the United States, foreseeability of
consequential damages resulting from a breach of a contract
for the sale of goods is determined by an objective test. The
U.C.C. limits damages to those "of which seller ... had
reason to know."104 The Restatement of Contracts also
requires "reason to foresee."105 Article 74 of the CISG,
however, is written in terms of both an objective and a
subjective test of 'loss which the party in breach foresaw or
ought to have foreseen." 0 6  In situations where the
breaching party knows of unusual losses which might occur
in case of a later breach, there is minimal difference be-
tween the objective and the subjective standards.0 7
Few U.S. courts have barred proof of buyer's lost profits
on the ground that the lost profits could not be foreseeable.
Judges in the United States apply various presumptions in
making their findings, some of which derive from case law
and some of which derive from comments to the U.C.C.
0 8
Courts begin with the assumption that cover is normally
possible whenever a breach occurs because one can usually
buy similar goods in a market economy.' Thus, if a
contract is breached, it is usually not foreseeable to a seller
at the time of contract formation that if he later breaches,
the buyer will not be able to cover, thus preventing the
on damages. Instead, if the defendant's conduct threatens any interest
of the plaintiff, defendant is liable for any resultant injury to plaintiff
unless that injury is extremely bizarre. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 435 (1965).
104 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (1981) (emphasis
added).
1O6 See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 688.
107 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 514-18; Sutton, supra
note 19, at 744 (stating that a party "may want to make ... dangers
known to the other contracting party in order to implicate the
subjective prong... Such notice, however, would also create objective
foreseeability today under the [U.C.C.] and the Restatement, thus
minimizing the differences between article 74 and American view of
foreseeability.").
18 See DUNN, supra note 88, at 36-43.
109 See supra note 50.
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buyer from performing his resale obligations. To recover
lost profits, a buyer must show that the seller actually
knew or should have known at the time of contract forma-
tion that cover would not be available upon breach. 110
Additionally, in order to recover damages for lost profits
a buyer must show that the seller knew or should have
known that the purchase was for resale and that the resale
would have earned the buyer a profit."' A buyer is as-
sisted in his proof by the U.C.C., which states that if the
seller knows that the buyer is purchasing for resale, then
loss of profit within a normal range is foreseeable." 2 In
these circumstances, a seller also is generally liable for
foreseeable claims by third parties against a buyer for his
failure to perform resale contracts involving the undelivered
goods."'
2.2.4.3. Proof With Reasonable Certainty
The "reasonable certainty" limitation - that damages
are recoverable only to the extent that they can be proved
with reasonable certainty - is a creation of U.S. law"4
and does not exist in the CISG. The Delchi court did not
cite any CISG authority supporting the proposition that
damages for lost profit must be proved with reasonable
certainty. Instead, the Delchi court imposed the common
law damage limitation while still maintaining that the
CISG was the controlling law of the contract. The district
110 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 918 ("Problems of foresee-
ability do not usually arise unless the injured party who is a buyer
cannot cover ....").
' See id. at 919-20. Because most goods are readily available in
a competitive market, the inability to cover is not foreseeable in the
ordinary course of events. See id. at 878-79. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(2)(a) (1981) ("Loss may be foreseeable as
a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach.. in
the ordinary course of events .. ").
112 See U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 6 (1991) (noting that damages resulting
from loss of resale profits are included under consequential damages).
Seller is not liable for extraordinary lost profit or losses from unusual
terms of buyer's resale contracts or "other circumstances of which seller
is ignorant." FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 919.
11 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 920 n.33 (citing Verhagen v.
Platt, 61 A.2d 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1948)).
114 See id. at 921.
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court stated:
[i]n conformity with the common law, see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 331 (sic);15 5
ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1020
(1951), and with the law of New York, see Merlite
Indus., Inc. v. Valassis Inserts, Inc., 12 F.3d 373, 376
(2d Cir. 1993), to recover a claim for lost profit under
UNCCISG, a party must provide the finder of fact
with sufficient evidence to estimate the amount of
damages with reasonable certainty.1
The sources cited by the district court make no mention
of the CISG, and Merlite involves a domestic sale. Some
form of the reasonable certainty limitation on damages,
even if not called for in the CISG, will be applied by courts
everywhere. 1 7 If there is a gap in the CISG on this point,
the Delchi court indeed was correct to apply the law of the
forum in a purely procedural matter. As one commentator
has stated, "[p]roblems of proof and certainty of loss are
procedural matters which remain within the province of
national law, and procedural conceptions may still serve as
covert limitations on CISG consequential awards." 8
If U.S. courts apply the certainty limitation to interna-
tional sales in the same manner as domestic sales, however,
then such courts may be exceeding procedural determina-
tions. There is a distinction between a court determining
that evidence is unreliable or uncertain and a court not
allowing any evidence of a type of loss because the law of
the jurisdiction refuses to allow damages for that type of
loss as a matter of law. In the latter situation, barring
evidence of damage from loss of goodwill is not merely a
procedural determination. Such a restrictive approach
could make lost profit from future sales and goodwill more
115 "Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the
evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981).
116 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *6 (footnotes added).
11 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 95, at 181-87.
118 Id. at 283 n.158.
637
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
difficult to obtain in some U.S. jurisdictions than in the
courts of other nations applying the CISG. At the very
least, disallowing evidence of loss of goodwill damage as a
matter of law undermines the predictability and harmoniza-
tion of litigation results under the CISG."9
Another problem with the certainty limitation is a lack
of predictable application by courts. Both the Restatement
of Contracts and the U.C.C. agree that a party can only
recover damages for breach of contract that can be shown
with reasonable certainty.120 It has been noted, however,
that in cases where lost profit is sought on a collateral
transaction, certainty, like foreseeability, is "a convenient
means for keeping within the bounds of reasonable expecta-
tion the risk which litigation imposes upon commercial
enterprise[s]."' 2' Furthermore, [i]f the test of foreseeabi-
lity is met, but the court nevertheless concludes that
liability would impose on the party in breach a risk dispro-
portionate to the rewards that the party stood to gain by
the contract, 'the test of certainty is the most usual surro-
gate."
22
119 Commentators have noted:
Because the legal principle of certainty [relating to damages for
loss of goodwill] in the plaintiff s case is indivisible from factual
questions about the amount and probity of plaintiffs evidence,
it is difficult to make sensible and useful generalizations about
that principle. Often cases cited under the certainty rubric
could be as easily explained by saying that the 'plaintiff merely
failed to prove his damages' or 'failed to prove his case.' So
stated, the principle is reduced to a homily.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 451.
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981); U.C.C.
§ 1-106 cmt. 1 (1991) (stating that damages "have to be proved with
whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more");
U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4 (1991) ('The burden of proving... consequential
damages is on the buyer, but the section on liberal administration of
remedies rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost
mathematical precision in the proof of loss. Loss may be determined in
any manner which is reasonable under the circumstances."); see also
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 269 ("The 'fact-amount' doctrine,
however, relaxes the burden of proof on the amount of loss once the
buyer has proven the fact of a loss . ").
121 CHARLES T. McCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 105 (1935).
122 L.L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 376 (1937). It has been forcefully
argued that the foreseeability rule should be abandoned because it
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Numerous U.S. court decisions have determined whether
evidence of damages for lost profits were allowed, and
whether such damages were proved with sufficient certainty
to be recoverable as consequential damages. Because these
decisions have reached very different conclusions on similar
facts, scholars, in an effort to make outcomes more predict-
able, have characterized these disparate results in three
categories.123 These categories, based on the nature of the
buyer and the nature of the lost profit, include: (1) a
middleman-buyer suing for lost resale profit on the goods
seller promised to deliver ("middleman-buyer"); 24 (2) a
manufacturer-buyer claiming lost profit due to seller's
defective performance of a promise to deliver goods neces-
sary for production ("manufacturer-buyer");2 5 and (3) a
permits only all-or-nothing recovery and does not necessarily prevent
disproportionate damages. See Lost Profits, supra note 34, at 1021-22.
This is because what courts often determine to be foreseeable was not
in fact foreseen or foreseeable since the test is based on a "fiction." Id.
One commentator argues:
[L]oss of profits resulting from breach is seldom foreseen by
either plaintiff or defendant at contract time. Moreover, when
the parties actually do foresee the risk of loss, they generally
allocate that risk... by a contractual provision for liquidated
damages .... But the foreseeability rule is not applied when
the loss was in fact considered; the rule is invoked only when a
court must effect an allocation for which the parties failed to
provide .... As a result, the foreseeability rule penalizes one
party for omissions made by both at contract time.
Id.
'r See Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and Consequential
Damages, 7 J.L. & CoM. 327, 399-423 (1987); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. b (1981) ("The difficulty of proving
lost profits varies greatly with the nature of the transaction.").
14 Courts have commonly awarded lost profits in this category,
including lost resale profits on goods purchased for inventory. Older
U.S. cases required that the defendant seller had to have had notice at
the time of contract formation of buyer's particular resale transaction.
Recent cases have allowed that "knowledge that the buyer was a
merchant or that the buyer was ordering quantities too large for its own
use" is sufficient for foreseeability of lost resale profits. MACAULAY ET
AL., supra note 102, at 133-34; see also Lost Profits, supra note 34, at
1009-10.
' In cases involving manufacturer-buyer's claims of profits lost
because a seller default delayed or prevented the manufacture and sale
of their final product, U.S. courts are reluctant to find that the lost
profits were foreseeable or reasonably certain. This type of case holds
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buyer in either category claiming loss of future sales due to
customer dissatisfaction which resulted from seller's breach
of a contract to sell goods ("loss of goodwill")." 6
Courts have been more hesitant to award lost profits to
buyers in the second and third categories because "the
provision of opportunities for gain may have a snowball
effect: opportunities breed further opportunities."1 27  In
the greatest possibility of disproportionate damages. See MACAULAY ET
AL., supra note 102, at 134.
126 See Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys.,
Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a distributor of
computer terminals can recover for loss of customer goodwill resulting
from sale of faulty terminals furnished by manufacturer); Roundhouse
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating that
although in some cases Ohio would allow a jury to consider loss of
goodwill in a breach of warranty case, where plaintiffs are unable to
show lost profits or attach any kind of goodwill value to it, such
damages must be denied as purely speculative); R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that a hog breeder
furnished with defective feed can recover for resulting damage to
reputation); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d
660 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that an owner of feed lot can recover for
loss of customers in connection with use of defective feed supplement
provided by feed company); Isenberg v. Lemon, 327 P.2d 1016 (Ariz.
1958) (stating that paint dealer can recover damages from manufactu-
rer for loss of profits and goodwill where paint manufacturer provides
dealer an unfit and inferior product for resale); Adams v. J.I. Case Co.,
261 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (explaining that a plaintiffs complaint
for damages for loss of business should not have been dismissed);
Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 473 N.E.2d 1066
(Mass. 1985) (commenting that a distributor of wine can recover for loss
of goodwill when wine purchased was spoiled by mold); Hydraform
Prod. Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339 (N.H.
1985) (finding that a manufacturer of wood stoves can only recover from
steel manufacturer for loss of profits on sales which steel manufacturer
should have foreseen under the terms of the contract and buyer cannot
recover for diminished value of business because it is too speculative);
Robert T. Donaldson, Inc. v. Aggregate Surfacing Corp. of Am., 47
A.D.2d 852, 366 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), appeal dismissed,
337 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1975) (noting that plaintiff, a surfacing company,
is entitled to recover for loss of profits due to damage to its reputation
sustained by a breach, but only to the extent that such damages are not
speculative); Sol-o-lite Laminating Corp. v. Allen, 353 P.2d 843 (Or.
1960) (stating that because damage to goodwill does not require exact
proof, plaintiff presented adequate evidence about the loss of goodwill
to the jury by showing loss of business and refusal of customers to
conduct subsequent business with plaintiff).
127 See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 312
(2d ed. 1985). One empirical study found that of approximately 200
cases decided between 1946 and 1955, buyer-middleman recovery was
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category two, the manufacturer-buyer category, courts
allowing damages for lost profit have no difficulty in finding
such losses foreseeable.12 When damages for lost profits
are not allowed, it is usually because of the plaintiff's
failure either to prove damages with reasonable certainty or
to prove causation.129 The "reasonable certainty" limita-
tion has been less restrictive when applied to established
businesses, which are better able to demonstrate the extent
of injury by introducing records of past profits into evi-
dence, or even evidence of profit records from similar
businesses. 31 On the other hand, new businesses have
not fared as well. In some cases, courts have precluded new
businesses, as a matter of law, from presenting evidence of
lost profits, although now the trend has been to allow such
evidence, but only upon meeting a higher standard of
proof.132
allowed in 75% of category one cases, but only in 50% of the buyer-
manufacturer category two cases. See Lost Profits, supra note 34, at
1016 n.137.
'8 See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 510 (8th Cir.
1971) ("Where a seller provides goods to a manufacturing enterprise
with knowledge that they are to be used in the manufacturing process
it is reasonable to assume that he should know that defective goods will
cause a disruption of production, and loss of profits is a natural
consequence of such disruption.").
'9 See National Controls Corp. v. National Semiconductor Corp.,
833 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1987) (disallowing damages due to plaintiffs
failure to prove defendant's breach was the "proximate cause of
[plaintiffs] loss of profits"); General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips,
490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (finding that plaintiff failed to
prove with a "reasonable degree of certainty" that his loss of profits was
due to defendant's breach).
130 See, e.g., Gurney Indus. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467
F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that "the effect of contractor's breach
... upon owner's profits was too remote to warrant recovery of loss of
anticipated profits"); Lewis, 438 F.2d at 511 (allowing recovery for lost
profits where a "reasonable approximation" of amount lost could be
calculated based on business record of past profit); Burrus v. Itek Corp.,
360 N.E.2d 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (allowing recovery of lost profits
based upon testimony of previous productivity).
' See, e.g., Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17 (7th
Cir. 1979) (allowing evidence of profit records from similar motel
businesses into calculation of plaintiffs lost profits).
132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. b (1981)
("However, if the business is a new one or if it is a speculative one that
is subject to great fluctuations in volume, costs or process, proof will be
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U.S. judges confronted with category three, loss of
goodwill, cases often disallow evidence of or deny damages
for lost goodwill or profits.' Damages for lost goodwill
or lost profits based upon potential future sales are not
awarded either because the damages are unforeseeable, not
proximately caused by the breach, or without proof with
reasonable certainty.14  Most claims for loss of goodwill
more difficult. Nevertheless, damages may be established with
reasonable certainty with the aid of expert testimony, economic and
financial data, market surveys and analyses, business records of similar
enterprises, and the like."); see also Frank L. Williamson, Comment,
Remedies - Lost Profits as Contract Damages for an Unestablished
Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C. L. REV.
693, 734 (1978) (urging the replacement of the new business rule with
"a less intractable test" which "takes into account developing commer-
cial and economic realities"); Eric J. Wittenberg, Comment, The State
of Lost Profits Damages and Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
in Pennsylvania, 6 J.L. & CoM. 531, 543 (1986) (explaining that while
Pennsylvania has eased the restrictions of the new business rule,
"certainty still remains the standard under Pennsylvania law").
133 But see WHITE & SUMMERS supra note 44, at 269 ("Claims for
lost goodwill have generated a split of authority. We think goodwill
losses should be recoverable, on proper proof, and provided there is no
double recovery."); see also Anderson, supra note 123, at 420 ("As
mercantile practice has moved toward defining parameters of meaning
and recognizing methods for calculation of goodwill by economists ang
accountants, goodwill has become more widely accepted as a recoverable
item of consequential loss.").
131 See National Controls Corp. v. National Semiconductor Corp.,
833 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing proximate cause and speculative
damages case); Dacor Corp. v. Sierra Precision, 753 F. Supp. 731, 733
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (Speculative-Manufacturer of scuba diving equipment
could not assert claim for loss of potential customers against supplier
of defective regulator hoses in action for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability since such damages are speculative and are "unrecover-
able in breach of contract" under Illinois law); Manuel Int'l, Inc. v. M.R.
Berlin Co., 525 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating as dicta that in a
speculative contract claim within a federal anti-trust claim under
Pennsylvania law (which did not apply to federal anti-trust action),
damages to business reputation and loss of potential customers are
speculative); Eastern Dental Corp. v. Isaac Masel Co., 502 F. Supp.
1354 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (disallowing damages for loss of goodwill in any
action based on breach of contract); Hydraform Prods. Corp. v.
American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985) (Souter,
J.) (stating that "[a]s a general rule ... goodwill may be recovered as
an element of consequential damages"); George H. Swatek, Inc. v. North
Star Graphics, Inc., 587 A.2d 629, 631-32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (explaining the issue of foreseeability where the trial court
properly excluded evidence of lost profits and injury to goodwill and
reputation as unforeseeable when date for delivery of the goods was not
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fail because the court found the evidence insufficient to
award damages. However, U.S. courts also have found, as
a matter of law, that loss of goodwill damages was not
subject to proof with reasonable certainty and that evidence
of such loss should be excluded."'
The district court in Delchi applied Article 74 to a
manufacturer-buyer situation and did not allow evidence on
the amount of damages for future "indicated orders" on the
basis that such evidence would be "speculative" and there
was "no evidence that ... Delchi's inability to fill those
orders was directly attributable to [or caused by] Rotorex's
breach."3 ' Thus, the court denied damages for loss of
"indicated orders," as have other U.S. courts, because the
damages could not be established with reasonable certainty.
certain).
' In Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205,
1225 (3d Cir. 1970), the court made the "legal conclusion" that "plaintiff
may not recover for loss of profits to a business because of customer
dissatisfaction or loss of good will." Id. The Neville court distinguished
this sort of loss of profits from "loss of profits... on the particular sale
or contract for the performance of which the goods in question were
purchased." Id. at 1225-26. In an earlier opinion applying the tacit
agreement test, Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 43 F.2d 689, 691 (2d
Cir. 1930), Judge Augustus N. Hand declared that "[wie can hardly
doubt that such an uncertain and perilous risk as indemnification
against loss ... of customers was never contemplated by the plaintiff
in this case. Nothing was said about it in the negotiations between the
parties, and it seems quite unlikely that it ever should have been
intended." Courts not applying the tacit agreement test have also held
as a matter of law that loss of customers is not reasonably foreseeable.
See Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743, 744-45 (7th Cir.
1976) (finding that a seller was not liable for damages for breach of a
contract for the sale of air conditioning equipment which resulted in a
buyer losing customers because seller and buyer were not in a fixed con-
tract covering a definite time period, "seller had no reason to know of
any subsequent job opportunities [buyer] might have with customers"
and no job opportunities with such customers were pending at the time
buyer severed the relationship). The Chrysler court, however, would
have allowed loss of profit on contracts in existence or those, "in the
offing," at the time of the contract.
136 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *6. The court of appeals' opinion
does not state that the district court would not allow evidence on the
number of indicated orders. In affirming the district court's ruling on
this issue, the Second Circuit held that finding such testimony to be
speculative was not clearly erroneous. See Delchi Carrier, SpA v.
Rotorex Corp., Nos. 95-7182, 95-7186, slip op. at 5 (2d Cir. Dec. 6,
1995).
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Although most states will allow evidence of damages of
loss of goodwill,"3 7 New York courts, still utilizing the
tacit agreement test, are more likely to rule that such
evidence is inadmissible."3 ' Until recently, Pennsylvania
courts also excluded "loss of goodwill" evidence. In 1990,
however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, having aban-
doned the "tacit agreement" test in 1977,139 seemed to
change Pennsylvania law regarding goodwill damages."
The new standard would allow plaintiffs to pursue claims
for goodwill damages under warranty theories, provided
that evidence can be introduced to: (1) establish a causal
nexus between the damages and the breach of warranty;
and (2) provide the trier of fact with a reasonable basis for
the calculation of damages.""
Anticipated profits do have a current discounted value.
Such profits may involve some uncertainty of proof, but to
disallow evidence of such damages as a matter of law is an
unjust denial of compensation which may occur in a U.S.
court applying the CISG.
2.2.5. Pre-Judgment Interest
The Delchi court awarded the plaintiff pre-judgment
interest on its reliance damages as well as on its consequen-
1"' Outside of Pennsylvania, "a majority of the cases have allowed
for the recovery of lost goodwill in proper circumstances." Anderson,
supra note 123, at 421 (footnote omitted). But see Robert P.
Barbarowicz, Comment, Loss of Goodwill and Business Reputation as
Recoverable Elements of Damages Under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
715 - the Pennsylvania Experience, 75 DICK. L. REV. 63, 63 (1970)
(highlighting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal "to permit
recovery for loss of goodwill").
138 See Barbarowicz, supra note 137, at 74-75.
139 In 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled the "tacit
agreement test and replaced it with a "had reason to know" test. This
new standard requires that "[i]f a seller knows of a buyer's general or
particular requirements and needs, that seller is liable for the resulting
consequential damages whether or not that seller contemplated or
agreed to such damages." P.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods.
Corp., 378 A.2d 288, 292 (Pa. 1977). Thus, a plaintiff need only prove
that damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time of entering into
the agreement.
140 AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915,
925-26 (Pa. 1990).
14' See id. at 926.
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tial damages for lost profits under CISG Article 78.142
Because Article 78 does not specify the proper interest rate,
the district court, in its "discretion,"1  ordered that inter-
est be paid at the U.S. treasury bill rate as set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a).14 The district court then ordered the
parties to submit the proper calculation of pre-judgment
interest within fifteen days.14"
Based on cultural differences between the signatory
nations, CISG Article 78, more so than any other provision
of the Convention, was the subject of disagreement.
141
Religious mandate prohibits interest in some countries and
capitalist and communist societies have different theories
about interest rates. 147  Article 78, as finally adopted,
states that "[i]f a party fails to pay the price or any other
sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest
142 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *7.
143 Id. See also James J. Callaghan, U.N. Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods: Examining the Gap Filling Role of
CISG in Two French Decisions, 14 J.L. & CoM. 183, 198 (1995) (noting
that the proper interest rate is generally determined according to the
law applicable to the contract as a whole). Arbitrators have used
conflicts rules to determine the rate of interest rather than the rule of
the forum. Callaghan suggests that arbitrators should use a rate which
indemnifies against the harm caused by the delay rather than the law
of any particular state. Id.
"' The United States Code states:
Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case
recovered in a district court. Execution therefor may be levied
by the marshal, in any case where, by the law of the State in
which such court is held, execution may be levied for interest on
judgments recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest
shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment,
at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as deter-
mined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted
auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States
Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the
judgment. The Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts shall distribute notice of that rate and
any changes in it to all Federal judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1988).
'45 Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *7.
146 Article 58 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Working Group's Draft
Convention, which authorized interest only for sellers, was not included
in the 1977 and 1978 drafts. See Sutton, supra note 19, at 749.
147 See id.
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on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recover-
able under article 74.*8 Article 78 is silent on whether
it applies to unliquidated as well as liquidated damages.
Additionally, Article 78 provides no guidance for calculating
such interest and gives no indication of the circumstances
under which pre-judgment interest should be awarded.
There is, however, an indication in prior drafts of the CISG
and in some of the comments by its drafters that pre-
judgment interest should not be allowed on unliquidated
damages.
149
The CISG, as applied in Delchi, is federal law. "Whether
or not to award pre-judgment interest in cases arising
under federal law has in the absence of a statutory directive
been placed in the sound discretion of the district
courts"15 if: (1) the cause of action arises under the laws
and treaties of the United States; (2) the Convention is
silent on the question of pre-judgment interest; and (3) the
policy of the Convention is consistent with such an
award.
1 51
It is questionable whether the last two criteria for
allowing a court discretion in this matter were met in
Delchi. Furthermore, CISG Article 7(2) directs a court as
follows:
Questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are
to be settled in conformity with the general principles
on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law.5 '
148 CISG art. 78, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 37, 19
I.L.M. at 689.
... See Sutton, supra note 19, at 749. The 1976 draft of the CISG
would not have allowed a buyer pre-judgment interest on unliquidated
damages.
150 In re Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting Lodges 743 & 1746, International Ass'n of Mach. v.
United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 446 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 825 (1976)).
' See id. at 154.
152 CISG art. 7(2), supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 23-24, 19
I.L.M. at 673.
646 [Vol. 16:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss4/1
1995] CISG AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
Arguably, because of the general language of Article 78
as enacted and the prior rejections of specific language by
its drafters, it is appropriate for a U.S. district court to
order pre-judgment interest on unliquidated damages.
CISG Article 78 does allow the award of pre-judgment
interest. If one reads the language of Article 78 - "if a
party fails to pay ... any other sum in arrears" - to
include consequential damages, Article 78 also would allow
interest on unliquidated damages. The drafting history and
the Article itself, however, seem to indicate that an award
of such interest was not intended by the drafters, or
perhaps that the drafters intentionally left the CISG silent
on this issue.
Whether to give pre-judgment interest on unliquidated
damages was arguably an issue that the drafters believed
should be properly resolved by resort to the local conflict of
law rules.15 s The district court in Delchi had diversity
jurisdiction over a case involving a contract between U.S.
and Italian corporations. In diversity cases like Delchi, a
federal district court will follow the conflict of laws rules
which prevail in its forum state."" Since Delchi did not
involve the foreign relations of the United States, federal
common law should not have been applied.'55 If the
153 See Sutton, supra note 19, at 750 ("If courts interpret article 78
in the context of their own legal traditions, then interest could conceiv-
ably be awarded under the Convention for liquidated as well as
unliquidated damages, or for damages based on current price and
substitute transactions.").
164 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494 (1941).
155 In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme
Court determined that there is no federal general common law. Since
then, federal courts have developed a federal common law in certain
limited fields, including the area of foreign relations. For example, in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the issue
was whether the "act of state" doctrine was governed by state or solely
by federal law, which would be binding on state courts. The Court, in
olding that federal decisional law controlled, stated that it "seems fair
to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state
doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins." Id. at 425;
see also ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUsINESS AND EcONOMIc
RELATIONS 1139 (1991) (stating thatBanco Nacionale de Cuba "is most
often cited in favor of a federal common law of foreign relations").
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district court in Delchi found the CISG silent on the issue
of awarding pre-judgment interest on unliquidated dama-
ges, the district court should have looked to New York
conflict of laws rules in order to determine whether New
York or Italian law controlled the issue. The Delchi court
might have determined that under New York conflicts rules,
New York had a "greater interest"156 in this matter than
Italy. Alternatively, the district court might have deter-
mined that the matter of pre-judgment interest is procedur-
al rather than substantive,"' and based its recovery on
the New York Code, which allows pre-judgment interest on
unliquidated damages for breach of contract.'5 8  The
16' See Joseph A. Zirkman, New York's Choice of Law Quagmire
Revisited, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 579, 586 (1985) (highlighting a New York
case in which the choice of law was determined by which jurisdiction
had "greater interest in deciding the particular litigated issue"); see also
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp.
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enforcing a contractual choice of Pennsylvania law
where Pennsylvania had a "reasonable relationship" to the subject of
the contract dispute).
157 In O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1984), the court held that calculation of pre-judgment interest in a
wrongful death action under a New York statute is considered a
substantive issue, but the issue of whether to award such interest
depended on whether p re-judgment interest was consistent with the
goals of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement. In
O'Rourke, the Second Circuit found the award of pre-judgment interest
was not consistent with those international agreements, but the Fifth
Circuit in Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1984), found that pre-judgment interest was consistent with the
Convention and was a valid exercise of the court's discretion.
158 According to the New York Code:
Interest to verdict, report or decision: (a) Actions in which
recoverable. Interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded
because of a breach of performance of a contract, or because of
an act or omission depriving or otherwise interfering with title
to, or possession or enjoyment of, property, except that in an
action of an equitable nature, interest and the rate and date
from which it shall be computed shall be in the court's discre-
tion.
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5001 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995).
Pennsylvania has developed a similar rule in its courts. See United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 113 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1940)
("Likewise it is well settled in Pennsylvania that in an action to recover
unascertained damages for a breach of contract the allowance of
interest prior to judgment is discretionary."). One scholar found that
courts consider the following laws applicable for the determination of
the interest rate:
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district court, however, engaged in no discussion about
these issues, but instead disregarded CISG Article 7 and
the legislative history of CISG Article 78. Although the
Delchi court might have come to the same conclusion if it
had analyzed the award under the CISG, a probing analysis
of these issues would have more positively influenced the
future application of the CISG.
3. THE GERMAN CASE
The German case concerning consequential damage
provisions similar to CISG Article 74 involved a buyer who
attempted to recover damages for future lost profits due to
his customer's dissatisfaction with the delivered goods. The
decision, handed down by the Federal Supreme Court of
Germany in 1980,"59 addressed consequential damages for
breach of a contract for the international sale of cheese.
3.1. Factual Background and Lower Court Decisions
Plaintiff ("Seller") was a Dutch exporter of cheese and
(1) law of place of payment: ICC award no. 7153, 1992 J.D.I.
1005; (2) law of creditor: LG Stuttgart Sept. 5, 1989, 1990
IPRAX 317; LG Frankfurt Sept. 16, 1991, 1991 RIW 952; KG
Berlin Jan. 24, 1994, 1994 RIW 683; OLG Miinchen Mar. 2,
1994, 1994 RIW 545: ICC award no. 7197, 1993 J.D.I. 1028; (3)
law of place of actual loss: LG Aachen Apr. 3, 1990, 1990 RIW
491; (4) proper law of contract: AG Oldenburg Apr. 24, 1990,
1991 IPRAX 336; LG Hamburg Sept. 26, 1990, 1991 IPRAX 400;
Belgian Cass., Nov. 29, 1990, 1990 RIW 1270; (5) law of debtor
or creditor: OLG Frankfurt June 13, 1991, 1991 RIW 591; OLG
Frankfurt Apr. 20, 1994, 1994 RIW 593.
HANS VAN HOUmTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 147 n.25 (1995).
See also Interpretive Decisions Applying CISG, Journal of Law &
Commerce Case I: Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt Am Main, 14 J.L. &
COM. 201, 202 (1995) ("Pursuant to German international private law,
to determine the interest rate under CISG Article 78, the court must
refer to national law."). Legal scholars and courts in Germany have
concluded that the conflict of law rules of the forum should determine
which law will govern the awarding of interest under the CISG. See
Peter Schlechtriem, Anmerkung, in SCHIEDSSPROCHE ZU STREITIGKEITEN
AUS INTERNATIONALEN KAUFVERTRAGEN: ANWENDBARKEIT DES CISG
590, 592-94 (1995).
159 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, BGH [Supreme Court], 1981
IPRAX 96-98; MICHAEL R. WILL, CISG - INTERNATIONAL BmLIOGRAPHY
1980-1995 (4th ed. 1995).
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Defendant ("Buyer") was a German importer of cheese who
resold the cheese to customers, including wholesalers.
160
In December 1976, after lengthy negotiations, the parties
finalized a contract for the cheese to be delivered to
Germany in January 1977.161 Seller delivered the cheese,
but when Buyer did not pay the full contract price, Seller
sued.'62 Buyer* claimed that: (1) Seller had agreed to
discount the sales price;163 and (2) Seller had breached the
contract because three percent of the cheese delivered was
defective.1
6 4
As a result of this defective delivery, Buyer alleged the
following damages: (1) four of Buyer's customers, who were
bulk buyers, discontinued business with Buyer, costing
Buyer 288,000 DM in lost profits over four years; (2) one of
Buyer's customers, Firm H, lost customers as a result of the
defective cheese, for which Buyer had to pay Firm H 80,000
DM; and (3) as a result of losing business relations with one
customer, Firm I, Buyer lost a group delivery arrangement,
which would increase Buyer's transportation costs by 62,400
DM over four years.' 6  At trial, Seller argued that
Buyer's customers left for other reasons. 6 6
The trial court 167 found for Seller and denied Buyer's
claims for consequential damages, but reduced the contract
price by three percent for the defective cheese.16  Buyer
160 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
161 The contract was for 28-day-old Gouda Cheese at 5.59 DMAkg.
See id.
id Seller claimed buyer owed 466,732.28 DM including interest. Seeid.
1 Buyer claimed Seller discounted the price to 5.50 DM/kg. Thus,
the contract price was 12,244.50 DM less than Seller claims. See id.
16 The defective cheese lacked ripeness, had softened, and had salt
deposits under their rinds. See id.
16 See id.
16 See id.
1 The trial court in Germany is known as Landgericht.
1 The trial court declared that Buyer owed Seller 453,812.28 DM
plus interest. The intermediate court, in affirming the trial court,
found that the contract price of the cheese was 5.59 DM/kg and that
three percent of the delivered cheese was defective. Additionally, the
court found that Buyer complained to Seller of the defective cheese in
a timely manner each time a customer demanded damages. See
Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
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then appealed to the intermediate court of appeals" 9 and
renewed its claim for consequential damages. 70 After
finding that three percent of the cheese delivered was
defective, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment in favor of Seller. 7 ' The court of appeals held
that Buyer's claims for consequential damages were to be
determined under Article 82 of the Unified Law of the
International Sale of Movable Things ('EKG"), the control-
ling law of the contract. 7 2 The EKG, however, was super-
1"9 The intermediate court of appeals in Germany is known as
Oberlandesgericht.
170 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
171 See id.
172 The German courts in this case applied Article 82 of the Unified
Law of the International Sale of Movable Things as the controlling law
of this contract for the sale of cheese between a German and Dutch
merchant. This law is one of two German laws derived from the 1964
Hague Conventions on the Sale of Goods which were adopted in
Germany on July 17, 1973. Article 82 of the Hague convention became
part of German law as the "Einheitliches Gesetz fiber den
Internationalen Kauf beweglicher Sachen," or "EKG." It is but one of
five different sets of laws which German courts continue to apply to
international sales contracts formed prior to January 1, 1991.
The second body of law derived from the 1964 Hague Conventions
is the Unified Law of the Formation of International Contracts for
Movable Things, known as the "Einheitliches Gesetz fiber den
Abschluss von Internationalen Kaufvertragen iber begegliche Sachen"
or UEAG." This body of law has been applied by German courts to
contract disputes when the parties have branch offices in different
contracting states and the contract in question involves a cross-border
sale.If a German court found that the EKG or the EAG did not apply to
an international sales contract, it would use German conflict of law
rules under Articles 27 and 28 of the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code ("BGB") to determine which law controlled the contract.
These conflict of law rules could result in two other bodies of law
controlling the contract. First, if the German court decided that
German municipal law controlled, the court would look to the BGB and
the German Commercial Code ("HGB"). However if the German court
decided that the law of a foreign country applied, it would apply the
national law of that country. Of course, if that foreign country were a
signatory to an international convention on the international sale of
goods, such as the Hague Conventions or the CISG, then that conven-
tion as applied by the signatory country would control the contract in
the German court. See Gerhard Manz & Susan Padman-Reich,
Germany Standardises Law on International Sale of Goods, INTVL FIN.
L. REv., Oct. 1990, at 14 (detailing the adoption of the CISG in
Germany).
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seded in 1990 in Germany by the CISG.173 Since CISG
Article 74 is substantively identical to EKG Article 82,
decisions under EKG Article 82 are informative as to how
German courts will treat consequential damages under the
CISG.
174
In denying Buyer's claims for consequential dama-
ges, 7 ' the court of appeals reasoned that a buyer can
only recover lost profits under EKG Article 82(2) if the
Seller can foresee at the time of the contract that Buyer's
customers would discontinue relations as a consequence of
a mere three percent rate of defective delivery. 17  Based
on a survey of trade associations, 177 the court of appeals
concluded that Seller could not reasonably have foreseen
loss from discontinued relations.1
71
3.2. The German Supreme Court Decision
On further appeal, the German Supreme Court
79
pointed out that the court of appeals erred in its finding
that the contracting parties affirmatively chose the EKG as
173 The complex formula governing the applicability of law as
discussed in the previous note was changed when the CISG came into
force in Germany on January 1, 1991. Because the CISG was self-
executing, it automatically repealed the confusing array of law
governing all contracts for the international sale of goods formed after
January 1, 1991. Although the EKG and the EAG do not apply to
contracts formed after 1990, the decisions of the German courts
interpreting them are instructive as to the probable application of the
CISG. These pre-CISG cases are particularly instructive because
Germany has adopted the complete text of the CISG, which is quite
similar to the EKG and the EAG. Indeed, some of the problems the
German courts encountered with the Hague Conventions may continue
under the German adoption of the CISG. As discussed supra note 172,
Germany accepted some major changes to its traditional law of
obligations in adopting the Hague conventions and the CISG. See Manz
& Padman-Reich, supra note 172, at 14.
174 See KRITZER, supra note 3, at 477 ("Because these ULIS articles
are so similar [EKG Article 82 and CISG Article 74], [A]rticle 82
precedents may be regarded as relevant to interpretations of CISG
[A]rticle 74.").
171 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
176 See id.
177 The survey focused on the German-Dutch Trade Association and
the Industrial and Trade Association of Diisseldorf. See id. at 98.
178 See id.
178 The German Supreme Court is known as Bundesgerichtshof.
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the controlling law of this contract.1 8 0 Nevertheless, the
German Supreme Court agreed that the EKG applied to
this contract because "there is nothing express or implied to
rule it out."181 Additionally, the German Supreme Court
determined that Seller did not contest the fact that three
percent of the cheese delivered under the contract was
defective."8 ' Finally, the German Supreme Court noted
that the lost profits claimed by Buyer and Firm H might
not have been caused by Seller's breach, but rather by
Buyer's delivery of defective cheese that was in stock prior
to the contract with Seller. 183 Seller, however, did not
raise this issue. After reviewing the facts and legal
analysis of the appeals court, the German Supreme Court
held that the court of appeals erred in regard to the issue
of foreseeability because it improperly used a survey of
180 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
.81 Id. at 97. Under German laws based on the Hague Conventions
(EKG and EAG), the parties to the contract were allowed to choose
which law controlled their contract, thereby avoiding application of the
EKG or the EAG. In the cheese case, the German Supreme Court noted
that the parties did not affirmatively choose the EKG as the controlling
law of their contract. However, because the parties did not impliedly
or expressly make a choice of law decision, the EKG would apply,
specifically Article 3 of the EKG. After the cheese case, in 1986, the
German Supreme Court went even further in applying Article 3 of the
EKG when deciding that a German court, in hearing a dispute between
United Kingdom and German partners, should apply the EKG even if
the contract expressly provides that the German municipal law should
apply. Although this 1986 decision allowed the contracting parties to
exclude, either expressly or impliedly, the EKG under Article 3, the
decision clarified that an implied exclusion will not readily be found.
The fact that the parties did not mention the EKG in the contract was
not held as an exclusion, presumably on the ground that the EKG was
also a part of German municipal law. To be certain that the EKG will
not apply to an international sales contract, the parties must expressly
exclude the EKG. The German Supreme Court's affirmative exclusion
was an interesting development because the United Kingdom, in
adopting the Hague Conventions as its Uniform Law for the Interna-
tional Sales of Goods Act in 1967, provided in § 1(3) that the Uniform
Law would control a contract of sale only if it was affirmatively selected
by the contract parties. In almost twenty years, no case arose in the
UK where the Uniform Law governed a contract. See F.A. Mann &
Herbert Smith, International Briefings: West Germany; When Uniform
Sales Law Applies, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1986, at 37.
182 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 98.
'a See id.
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trade organizations to determine trade custom.1 8 4
The German Supreme Court agreed with the court of
appeals that under EKG Article 82(1) a seller is liable for
lost profit damages resulting from a delivery of defective
goods.185 Damages for lost profits, however, are available
only to the extent that the seller should have foreseen the
lost profit at the time of contract formation, under the
conditions that the seller knew or should have known would
possibly result from a breach.186 The test formulated by
the German Supreme Court is what a "reasonable, ideally
typical obligor would expect to happen under the circum-
stances."18 7 Because Seller knew that Buyer was a mid-
dleman, the German Supreme Court determined that it was
foreseeable that Buyer would intend to resell the cheese for
a profit. 8 An industry survey could determine whether
profits beyond those lost on the resale of the specific
defective cheese were foreseeable to the Buyer. 89 In fact,
the German Supreme Court cited a prior 1965 German
Supreme Court decision approving the use of survey
evidence of trade custom and knowledge. 9 '
The German Supreme Court suggested that the proper
survey question was: whether a seller who knows at the
time of contract formation that a buyer will resell the goods
should be liable for either a buyer's lost profits due to lost
customers or for a buyer's damages resulting from the
buyer's customer losing sales because of its lost customers,
when three percent of a product delivered on the original
contract was defective. 9' Furthermore, a proper survey
question would indicate that, at the time of contract
formation, both the seller and the buyer knew that Dutch
imports saturated the German cheese market. 92 With
such market saturation, a threat existed that the customers
' See id.
185 See id. at 97.
'86 See id.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 97-98.
189 See id. at 98.
o See id. (citing Judgment of Dec. 1, 1965, 1966 NJW 502).
191 See id.
1 See id.
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of middlemen-buyers might readily change suppliers, even
for trivial reasons aside from the substantial defects com-
plained of by Buyer.9 '
After reviewing the survey and the legal findings of the
court below, the German Supreme Court found that the
court of appeals addressed the correct legal issue."9
According to the German Supreme Court, CISG Article 82
requires a subjective and an objective test that can conclu-
sively be met by a survey demonstrating a trade custom of
foreseeability.'95 The German Supreme Court, however,
found that the court of appeal's survey was procedurally
flawed because the survey did not allow Seller to know the
contents of the basic survey questions, the people surveyed,
or the competence of survey respondents. 9 6 The appeals
court's decision was remanded for a re-examination of the
foreseeability issue."'
Because German civil procedure allows a trial de novo in
an appeal to the intermediate court, 98 a court of appeals
can make its own determination of the facts and utilize a
survey in order to determine foreseeability. The German
Supreme Court hears appeals on errors of law only, and, in
193 See id.
" The German Supreme Court based its determination on the
finding that lost profits were unforeseeable as informed by a written
inquiry to the trade associations regarding the state of mind of
merchants in the field on April 4, 1978. The survey inquired as to
whether a Dutch importer in January 1977, who delivers cheese to a
German importer, should have foreseen that customers of the German
importer would discontinue business if three percent of the goods
delivered by the Dutch importer were defective, as was the cheese in
this case. Based on this survey, the court of appeals found the damages
claimed by Buyer were unforeseeable. See id.
19 See id.
' Most importantly, the court of appeals failed to disclose the
survey questions. It was not clear to the German Supreme Court
whether the court of appeals' survey asked about the foreseeability of
the buyer's customers discontinuing business or about the foreseeable
behavior of the customer's customers discontinuing business as a result
of the defects. See id.
19 See id.
198 A "berufung' is an appeal on points of fact and law. See
DANNEMANN, supra note 27, at 111-13; David S. Clark, The Selection
and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a
Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1808-14 (1988).
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the instant case, found the flawed survey process to be an
error of law.'99 The German Supreme Court, although it
did articulate a rule of foreseeability, did not rule as a
matter of law whether the damages Buyer suffered due to
lost customers were foreseeable.
3.3. The Background of German Law on Consequential
Damages
It is difficult to make generalizations about contract
remedies in German law."' It is fair to conclude, how-
ever, that although German law, unlike the U.C.C., favors
specific relief in theory, it shares a common principle with
the U.C.C. and the CISG: a remedy is intended "to put the
obligee in the same position, economically speaking, as he
would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred.""' This
" See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 98. "Revision" is
an appeal on points of law. See DANNEMANN, supra note 27, at 111. In
the cheese case, the German Supreme Court cited a prior decision in
which the BGH discussed the difference between unreviewable factual
findings of trade usage and unsubstantiated official declarations which
are subject to review. See Judgment of Dec. 1, 1965, 19 NEUE
JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHEIFT [NJW] 502, 503. Although not referred to
by the Court, the German Code of Civil Procedure § 139(1) states "[tihe
presiding judge shall ensure that the parties completely disclose all
relevant facts and make the pertinent motions, and especially also
supplement insufficient particulars concerning asserted facts and
describe the evidence . ... " ZIVILPROZE3ORDNUNG [ZPO] § 139,
translated in THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY OF JANUARY 30, 1877 AND THE INTRODUCTORY ACT FOR
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF JANUARY 30, 1877 37 (Simon
L. Goren trans., 1990); see also Hein K6tz, Civil Litigation and the
Public Interest, 1 CIV. JUST. Q. 237, 242 (1982) ("[A] judge's failure to
discharge his duties under section 139 constitutes a procedural error.").
0 "The drafters of the German Civil Code approached the general
problem of the relief available to an aggrieved party from three
different perspectives: (1) a distinction between one-sided and two-
sided contracts; (2) separate treatment of cases of delay (Verzug) and
of impossibility; and (3) individualized handling of, and special rules
for, various typical contractual regimes (e.g., sale, contract to make an
object (Werkvertrag), contract to furnish services, (Dienstvertrag)). This
approach results in an intricate and complex system which renders
generalization difficult." ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R.
GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1108 (2d ed. 1977) (footnotes
omitted).
201 Id. at 1109 n.27 (citing ERWIN DITTMAR, Das Problem der
Schadenersatzleistung 218 (1946)).
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underlying philosophy has led German courts to develop
concepts of breach and remedies beyond what the BGB
literally allows, particularly in the area of damages for a
delivery of defective goods.20 2
Under the BGB, a buyer can obtain damages for delivery
of defective goods for breach of warranty0 3 in only two
situations: (1) when the defect destroys or significantly
diminishes the value or fitness of the goods for ordinary use
or for the purpose provided for in the contract; or (2) when
the goods lack the quality which seller expressly guaran-
teed.20 4 Under BGB section 463, if the seller has guaran-
teed that the goods sold have a specific attribute, or if the
seller fails to disclose a known defect, then a buyer may be
able either to rescind the contract or seek a reduction in
price and claim damages.0 5 Implied guarantees or war-
ranties are not easily established,0 6 however, and without
such a guarantee or without evidence of fraudulent conduct
by the seller, the buyer's remedies under the BGB are
limited to either rescission ("Wandelung") or a reduction of
the sales price ("Minderung). °7 If the goods are fungible,
then the buyer can demand substitute goods.20 8 These
remedies are exclusive, and the BGB does not otherwise
2102 The BGB classifies breach as being of two possible types: delay
in performance, "Verzug," or impossibility, "Unm6glichkeit." After the
enactment of the BGB in 1902, the courts developed a concept of
positive breach, "positive Vertragsverletzung," for defective perform-
ance. See NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 105 (1982). The discovery of the necessity for
positive breach occurred in 1904; see E.J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW 117 (2d ed. 1968). But cf. Eyal Zamir, Toward a General Concept
of Conformity in the Performance of Contracts, 52 LA. L. REV. 1, 9 n.12
(1991) (standing alone in dating the development of the doctrine to the
1920s). The most likely date is 1902, with the delivery of an influential
paper by Staub on a German Juristentag. See infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
203 See BORGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 459.
M4 See HORN ET AL., supra note 202, at 125-26.
205 See BGB § 463.
206 See HORN ET AL., supra note 202, at 127-28. Whether a
warranty will be implied may depend on the type of trade involved.
German courts may readily find implied warranties when used car
dealers state that a car is road-worthy or overhauled. Id.
207 See COHN, supra note 202, at 134.
208 See BGB § 480.
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allow consequential damages. 9
Since 1902, German courts have developed an alterna-
tive means to make a buyer whole for a partial breach
resulting from a seller's delivery of defective goods. Buyers
can now make a claim on the basis of a "positive breach,"
but in order to prevail there must be proof that the seller
was at fault.y° Section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure
sets the standard of proof as "mere probability," which is
arguably a lower standard than reasonable certainty under
U.S. law."1'
The German Supreme Court in applying the EKG to the
cheese case did not impose any of these BGB or court devel-
oped restrictions on Buyer's right to claim consequential
damages. Instead, the German Supreme Court referred to
EKG Article 82(1) which allows consequential damages
without evidence of warranty, fraud, or fault.
212
It is questionable whether the German Supreme Court
used the principles of the EKG, or was influenced equally
by national legal doctrines when stating the standards for
determining the recoverable amount of consequential
damages. BGB section 252 sets forth the German Code
standard for calculating consequential damages. Section
252 provides that "damages to be recovered include lost
profits ... [p]rofit is deemed to be lost which could have
been expected with probability according to the ordinary
course of events or in view of particular circumstances,
especially the preparations and provisions made."
213
Under the BGB, this probability determination is made at
the time of breach. 4 Plaintiff must prove only that the
circumstances referred to in the second sentence of BGB
section 252, "ordinary course of events or particular
circumstances," existed. After proving that these circum-
209 See HORN ET AL., supra note 202, at 126.
210 See COHN, supra note 202, at 133; HORN ET AL., supra note 202,
at 112-14.
211 See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 200, at 1114 n.49
(arguing also that certainty is a greater burden of proof in U.S. law
than the normal burden of a preponderance of the evidence).
21 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
213 BGB § 252.
214 See id. § 252.
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stances existed, it is presumed that the profits would have
been earned but for the occurrence of the breach.215
Defendant, to avoid liability for lost profit, must then show
that "his default [did not] appreciably increase the objective
possibility of loss of a kind that in fact occurred."216
The BGB does not distinguish contractual liability from
tort liability, and sections 241 through 304 apply to obliga-
tions arising from both.217 The limitations on consequen-
tial damages set forth in these sections of the BGB include
general principles of avoidability218 and comparative
fault 9.2 1  Furthermore, the BGB does not limit the recov-
ery of consequential damages to those which are foresee-
able.
-220
Early commentary on the BGB suggested an interpreta-
tion of BGB section 252 that would limit lost profits to
those foreseeable under the circumstances as a probable
consequence of breach.221 Until the late 1970s, this inter-
pretation was rejected in favor of an approach which viewed
section 252 as simplifying proof of causation rather than
acting as limiting damages to those that were foreseeable.
Section 252 was interpreted as permitting the use of
objective market evidence, such as what damage reasonable
sellers would expect a breach to cause under market
conditions, rather than having to present evidence of the
particular subjective intention the BGB. The traditional
215 See GUENTER H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
164 (1988).
216 Id. at 107.
217 See BGB §§ 241-304.
218 See id. § 254(2).
219 See id. § 254(1). BGB §§ 251 and 254(2) provide that if the
buyer knows of the potential of high damages, he must warn the seller
or have his damages reduced on the basis of comparative fault. BGB
§ 242, which requires good faith, has been cited as precluding dispropor-
tionate damages, but this argument has been disputed. See infra note
233. The "expectation ceiling" concept is traced to German law. See
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 95, at 183-87.
220 See TREITEL, supra note 215, at 164 (stating that the legislative
history of the BGB shows a deliberate rejection of the foreseeability
test).
221 See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 200, at 1115 n.53
(citing II/l PLANCK (-STROHAL), KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH 252 (4th ed. 1914)).
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test for recovery of consequential damages was whether the
obligor's breach, "as judged by ordinary human standards
at the time of its occurrence, renders more likely damages
of the kind actually suffered."222
In the late 1970s, as legal scholars again debated the
necessity of adopting a foreseeability limitation on contract
damages, 2 ' German courts began to apply the foreseeabil-
ity limitation to certain types of contract damages.224 The
German cheese case has been cited as an early example of
the development by German courts of the foreseeability
limitation to cases where a defendant, after selling goods to
a middleman, is sued for goodwill damages resulting in lost
profits and lost customers because of the delivery of
defective goods. 25
3.4. The German Supreme Court's Interpretation of the
EKG
In the cheese case, the German Supreme Court applied
the EKG doctrine of foreseeability as a limit on damages for
lost profit, using the time of contract formation, rather than
the time of breach, as the vantage point from which to
determine foreseeability.226 Given the contemporaneous
development by German courts of a foreseeability limita-
tion, it is difficult to determine if the German Supreme
Court's decision in the cheese case was a faithful applica-
tion of the EKG, or merely an application of a developing
doctrine of German national law.
As stated earlier, the German law for damages arising
out of the domestic sale of goods initially "reject[ed] foresee-
ability as a method of limiting liability for default in the
222 Id. at 1115 n.57 (citing Judgment of Feb. 15, 1913, in 81
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS, ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 359).
223 See Peter Schlechtriem, Voraussehbarkeit und Schutzzweck einer
verletzen Pflicht als Kriterium der Eingrenzung des ersatzfdhigen
schadens im deutschen Recht, in LAw IN EAST AND WEST 505, 512
(Institute of Comparative Law ed., 1988).
224 See id. at 514-15.
21 See id. at 514 (noting that the EKG foreseeability limitation
influenced the development of German case law for domestic sales).
226 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
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performance of a contract."22 Instead, until several years
before the cheese case, courts used a theory of "adequate
causation" as the primary test to determine contract damag-
es." Under the "adequate causation" test, which Ger-
man courts still apply,29 a breaching party "is liable for
a loss if his default appreciably increased the objective
possibility of loss of a kind that in fact occurred."3 0 A
breaching party is not liable if the default was, in the
ordinary course of events, a matter of indifference with
regard to what actually occurred and only became a
"condition of the occurrence of the loss as a result of
unusual or intervening events." " Whether a breach is
an adequate cause is determined by a court applying the
objective standard of an:
experienced observer at the time of the default, or
even according to one formulation, that of the most
experienced observer (optimaler Beobachter). To
such an observer the court attributes knowledge of
all the circumstances of which a person of that kind
could have known, as well as any additional circum-
stances of which the wrongdoer himself actually
knew."2
Thus, under the "adequate causation" test there is both an
objective and a subjective test of causation, which does not
limit, but rather, expands damage.
In applying the EKG, the German Supreme Court
referred to the subjective and objective limitations of the
foreseeability test. 33 The German Supreme Court held
that the seller is liable for damages that a "reasonable,
ideally typical obligor would know to be a serious conse-
227 LUDWIG ENNECCERUS & HEINRICH LEHMAN, RECHT DER
SCHULDVERHAELTNISSE 73 (15th ed. 1958).
228 Id.
22 See Schlechtriem, supra note 223, at 507-08.
230 TREITEL, supra note 215, at 163.
231 Id. at 163.
232 Id.
233 See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
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quence of a breach in light of the circumstances." 234 In
reaching its formulation of foreseeability, the German
Supreme Court cited commentaries comparing the doctrines
of foreseeability in numerous other legal systems.2 5  Of
primary influence were commentaries on EKG Articles 13
and 82 concerning the meaning of "what a party knew or
should have known."236 Based on these commentaries,
the German Supreme Court determined that a judge should
ask not "what the obligor in the situation knew or should
have known, but what the 'ideal obligor' should have
known,"' a test that seems to combine foreseeability
with the Court's prior standard of adequate causation.
Whether there is really a significant difference between
how German courts have applied the "adequate causation
test" and the way in which most U.S. courts apply the
foreseeability test is a question raised by legal scholars.
Both tests refer to the recovery of losses that occur "in the
ordinary course of things," or according to the "common
experience of mankind."2 9 These formulations are simi-
lar to the first rule of Hadley - that the loss must flow
naturally from the breach.24" Both the German and the
U.S. tests also seem to employ the second Hadley
prong:241 the German courts use an objective test to ask
what an optimal obligor would expect to happen in the
ordinary course of things, while U.S. courts ask what a
reasonable person would expect to happen.2 42 Both Ger-
man and U.S. courts first attribute the knowledge of
surrounding circumstances to the reasonable person,
knowledge that an ordinary person could normally be
s4 Id. at 97.
25 See id.
236 Id. at 97-98.
2 HANs DOLLE, KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLIcBEN KAUFRECHT 63
(1976).
238 See TREITEL, supra note 215, at 164-65 (arguing that there is "a
considerable degree of similarity between the two theories).
239 Id. at 164 (citations omitted).
24 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
241 Id. (stating the loss as one "reasonably ... supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the
contract").
242 See TREITEL, supra note 215, at 164-65.
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expected to have, and then add the knowledge which the
defendant actually had.2" Despite the similarities, the
German approach of adequate causation, in borderline
cases, is thought to be more favorable to plaintiffs than the
foreseeability limitation.2"
At the time of the cheese case, the German Supreme
Court also was aware that U.S. jurisdictions did not
uniformly apply the test of foreseeability.2," One author
cited by the German Supreme Court concluded, after a
description of the development of the "contemplation of the
parties" test in the United States, that foreseeability "is not
simply determined by empirical standards but involves a
question of policy ... [it is] essentially a question of
allocating risks and losses."
246
Clearly, the German Supreme Court did not use a "tacit
agreement-contemplation of the parties" test of foreseeabili-
ty under the EKG. The German Supreme Court's applica-
tion offoreseeability more closely resembled that of the U.S.
courts that do not use the tacit agreement test. Now that
German courts take into account both the adequate causa-
tion test and the foreseeability test, one would expect that
damages would be granted on a more limited basis in
German judgments. Cases cited as evidence of the German
development of the foreseeability limitation tend to be
243 See id.
244 See id. at 165. The example given is a contract to sell a house
to a purchaser who could have made an unusually high profit out of a
resale of the house. It is argued that under the Anglo-American
foreseeability test, the buyer could not collect for more than ordinary
lost profit, while in Germany, "so long as the 'kind' of loss suffered
satisfies the 'adequate causation' test the defendant is liable to the full
'extent' of the loss." Id. This state of affairs has led to reform
movements in Germany to limit damages. See id. at 166. One
suggestion, that BGB § 242 requiring good faith be used to limit
damages, has been criticized as being too uncertain. See id. The
criticism that German law does not recognize a principle requiring
liability to be proportionate to the degree of fault led to a proposal for
an amendment of the BGB that would make the degree of fault a
relevant factor for reducing damages, which otherwise would be
exceptionally high. An additional factor in German law that favors
plaintiffs is that the expected consequences of a breach are determined
at the time of the breach rather than at the time of formation. See id.
245 Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 97.
24 See Knig, supra note 87, at 130.
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generous in determining what risks the ideal obligor has
undertaken, 247 perhaps because of a lingering hesitancy
to stray too far from a tradition based on adequate causa-
tion. It also is not surprising that a German court would
apply the newly adopted foreseeability test of the ULIS or
the CISG in a manner consistent with its prior national
law, which is generally more favorable to the obligee than
the obligor.
The German Supreme Court's decision in the cheese case
does, however, clearly reflect German legal tradition in the
manner in which foreseeability was proved. The proof used
by both the court of appeals and German Supreme Court
was a survey of trade associations. 2' The German Su-
preme Court justified this evidentiary device on the basis of
a 1966 decision under German law. 249 This approach is
compatible with German procedure, under which the
intermediate court of appeals effectively conducts a trial de
novo.
250
An appellate court in the United States would not utilize
a survey of persons in the cheese industry, as did the
German Court of Appeals. In the United States, even at
the trial court level, such evidence would be considered
hearsay and likely would be excluded on either of two
grounds: (1) it deprives the parties of the right to cross-
examination and (2) it lacks probative value.25' In the
241 See Schlechtriem, supra note 223, at 514-15.
248 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 190.
2'0 See NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LAW & LEGAL SYSTEM 156 (1993);
supra note 198 and accompanying text.
"' See generally Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The
Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HARV. L. REV. 498, 501-06 (1953) (identifying
the hearsay rule and probative value as two major evidentiary problems
surrounding the use of public opinion surveys in a court of law)
[hereinafter Public Opinion]. In the United States, this type of polling
evidence has been admitted in intellectual property cases to determine
the similarity of products. See, e.g., Tomy Corp. v. P.G. Continental,
Inc., 534 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing survey which showed
confusion between similar products admitted in unfair competition
case); Miles Labs, Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
(allowing a survey which demonstrated confusion between trademark
owner's name and that of an alleged infringer). The results of surveys
have also been admitted in support of motions for change of venue. See,
e.g., United States v. Tokars, 839 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
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United States, an expert may testify based upon a poll, but
a party wishing to use a poll should have available "a
complete record of the methods by which the universe and
sample were selected, and of the techniques for selecting
and instructing the interviewers."252 Additionally, inter-
viewers should be available for cross-examination. 3 The
German Supreme Court is generally more willing to use
opinion polls, in accordance with a German legal tradition
that predates the adoption of the EKG. In the cheese case,
however, the German Supreme Court indicated in its
opinion that it had a healthy skepticism of the reliability of
opinion polls, insisting that the party seeking to use the
survey divulge the fundamental structure of the survey to
the other party.
254
4. CONCLUSION
In both of the cases discussed, courts denied a buyer's
damage claims for both lost profit damages on prospective
contracts and loss of goodwill because of lack of sufficient
proof. That the courts arrived at similar conclusions was
(admitting a survey into evidence to show that a substantial portion of
potential jurors had already formed an opinion regarding a criminal
defendant's guilt or innocence).
Although defendants in many cases, especially obscenity cases, often
try to have surveys admitted to show that the materials at issue were
not offensive when judged by contemporary community standards, such
polls are infrequently admitted into evidence because it is difficult to
fashion questions that will produce relevant responses. See, e.g., United
States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1988) (excluding a public
opinion poll because questions were not designed to elicit information
about whether there was community acceptance of materials in
question); State v. Cooley, 766 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(excluding survey offered to show that other neighborhood stores sold
similar materials and that defendant's publications therefore did not
offend community standards).
In administrative hearings, however, where there are less formal
rules of evidence, such polls often have been admitted into evidence.
See, e.g., Arrow Metal Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 249 F.2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1957)
(upholding FTC's admission of survey offered to show whether a term
was capable of deceiving the public).
252 Public Opinion, supra note 251, at 507.
253 See id., supra note 251, at 507.
" See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1980, 1981 IPRAX at 98; supra note 196
and accompanying text.
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not, however, due to the identical application of the princi-
ples of similar international sales convention articles. The
U.S. district court in Delchi referred briefly to scholarly
comments 55 on the CISG before applying the CISG in a
manner totally consistent with the law of New York, which
was the seller's place of business. The district court did not
use a more detailed analysis, which was readily available in
the literature,256 nor make any other attempt to "set aside
national thinking."
257
The German Supreme Court, in applying the ULIS
through the EKG in the cheese case, made a greater effort
to consult the available literature on the principles underly-
ing the ULIS Convention. The German Supreme Court, in
many particulars, followed international principles rather
than its own national law. In accordance with the ULIS,
the German Supreme Court was willing to allow damages
for a delivery of defective goods amounting to only three
percent of the total contract amount, without requiring
proof of fault or an express guarantee of quality. The
German Supreme Court cited numerous authorities on the
ULIS and discussed the principle of foreseeability as a
limitation on contract damages for lost profit. The German
Supreme Court applied the foreseeability limitation at the
time of contract formation rather than, as under national
law, at the time of breach.
The German Supreme Court also discussed the subjec-
tive and objective nature of the foreseeability limitation
under the ULIS, although it finally used an objective test
that resembled both its national tradition of determining
adequate causation and the emerging court-developed
doctrine of foreseeability. The German Supreme Court's
decision ultimately rested on a national approach to
255 See Delchi, 1994 WL 495787, at *5. The district court first cited
JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES § 415 (2d ed.
1991) for the proposition that the "EICISG permits recovery of lost profit
resulting from a diminished volume of sales." Delchi, at *6. Second, the
district court cited a Comment for the proposition that CISG Article 74"seeks to provide an injured party with the benefit of the bargain." Id.
at *4 (citing Sutton, supra note 19, at 742-43).
26 For a recently published bibliography giving a detailed list of
this literature, see WILL, supra note 159.
2W Kritzer, supra note 3, at 109.
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adequate causation, foreseeability, and manner of proof.
Thus, because of Germany's less formal rules of evidence
and its less limiting application of foreseeability, plaintiffs
such as Delchi would more likely obtain damages for lost
profit or goodwill under the CISG in a German court than
in a U.S. court. Of course, this situation will lead to forum
shopping, an outcome the CISG drafters sought to avoid.
CISG Article 7(1) stresses the "need to promote unifor-
mity in its application."258 The Secretariat Commentary
to Article 7 states that "[n]ational rules on sales of goods
are subject to sharp divergences in approach and concept.
Thus, it is especially important to avoid differing construc-
tions of the provisions of this Convention by national courts,
each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system
of the country of the forum."
259
Some argue that "[piroblems of proof and certainty of
loss are procedural matters which remain within the pro-
vince of national law."260 Article 7(2) states that any gaps
in the CISG are to be "settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of
such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law."2 61 Cer-
tainly, matters that are clearly procedural will not be
subject to the CISG or any other rules besides those of the
forum. In those U.S. jurisdictions where prospective lost
profits and lost goodwill damages are not recoverable as a
matter of law, however, such matters should be subject to
the choice of law determinations in CISG Article 7(2).62
258 CISG art. 7(1), supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9 at 23, 19
I.L.M. at 673.
29 Commentary, art. 6, supra note 26, at 17.
2r0 LoOKOFSKY, supra note 95, at 283 n.158.
261 CISG art. 7(2), supra note 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9 at 23-24, 19
I.L.M. at 673.
26 Articles 27 and 28 of the Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch ("EGBGB") state that if no choice of law is indicated in the
contract, courts should apply the law to which the contract has the most
significant relationship. EGBGB art. 28(1). For another view, see
DANNEMANN, supra note 27, at 54 (stating that German scholars are
debating whether issues left to domestic law should be addressed by
"applying the law that has the closest link with the particular question,
or whether one should assume a hypothetical 'proper law of the
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Perhaps the Delchi court should have applied CISG Article
7(2) to determine whether under New York conflict rules
the law of Italy was the controlling law of the contract and,
if so, how Italian law applies the foreseeability test to
prospective lost profits under the Italian Code.263
That a German court fared better than a U.S. court in
referring to and following the guidelines of legal scholars is,
in part, due to the fact that Germany is a civil law jurisdic-
tion, where courts traditionally give such literature more
weight." 4 The U.S. court, accustomed to referring more
often to code annotations or prior decisions, was able to rely
on neither. By giving terse mention to the CISG articles at
issue, by ignoring the extensive literature on the CISG, and
by interpreting the CISG articles according to New York
law without analysis of the Convention, the U.S. district
court created an unfortunate first decision on the subject of
consequential damages under the CISG.
The Delchi decision fulfills a "gloomy prospect,"265 of
which one scholar cited by the Delchi court warned. There
is a "danger... that these tribunals will apply the Conven-
tion within the limited context of their own legal tradi-
tions," he cautioned, "exposing in the process the lack of
consensus and resulting ambiguity of certain provi-
sions.3
2 6 6
contract').
21 See Codice Civile § 1225 (Italy).
284 See DANNEMANN, supra note 27, at 5 (noting that "the influence
of scholars on the interpretation and development of law is much
greater in Germany than in most common law countries").
2 Sutton, supra note 19, at 741.
266 Id.
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